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C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000002

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TAGS: NATO PREL
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE: REVIEW OF DEFENSE PLANNING
PROCEDURES

REF: A. A. NATO PO(2008)0158(INV)
 ¶B. B. MCM-0160-2008

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker for Reasons 1.4(b) & (d)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Based upon a tasking from Defense Ministers at their meeting in Vilnius in February of 2008, NATO has undertaken a fundamental review of the Defense Planning Processes in an attempt to harmonize all Alliance work towards meeting the Alliance's required capabilities. The goal is to bring all NATO capability planning efforts - Armaments, Communications-Electronics, Logistics, Air Defence, Force and Resources - within one coherent structure. By taking a step by step approach and adhering to the dictum that form follows function, the Executive Working Group-Reinforced (EWG(R)) has made great progress in defining the outline model of the defence planning processes. The developed model was noted by the NAC on 16 December (Ref A). France has participated fully in this work and reforming the defense planning process in this way allows France to claim for domestic political reasons that it is re-joining a transformed NATO. The NATO Military Committee has provided advice on the project (Ref B). However, as the discussion turns to the next steps of governance issues and support structures it has become more contentious because it has implications for NATO HQ structures and relationships, uncovering "rice bowl" issues. This cable requests guidance and makes recommendations on several issues and seeks specific U.S. redlines in the governance issues and the development of the committee with oversight on Defence Planning. USDELNATOMIC joins USNATO in this request for guidance. End Summary

Governance Issues

¶2. (C/NF) Step One - Providing Political Guidance: In this step the to be determined committee with oversight on defence planning develops one overarching political guidance for all of the planning domains. This guidance includes a Level of Ambition (LOA) which is currently developed by the Defence Review Committee and agreed by Defence Ministers. The LOA will be used to guide the work to determine the required capabilities. General consensus has been reached that this guidance is pol-mil in nature but it requires input from the various planning domains to ensure that it address any specific issues that then need to guide their work. Some nations (IT, SP, PO, GR, TU) would like to have the Military Committee (MC) play a role in this step. Currently the MC does not have a role in developing political guidance. In our view all U.S. equities are protected by the interagency guidance provided to the U.S. representatives on the senior committee developing the Political Guidance, and there is little benefit, and considerable risk, associated with giving reluctant Allies "two bites at the apple."

¶3. (C/NF) Step Two - Requirements Generation: Here the

Strategic Commands (SCs) (Allied Command Operations (SHAPE) and Allied Command Transformation), both led by U.S. flag officers, develop the Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) listing capabilities, both military and non-military, that NATO needs to meet the level of ambition. This is then compared against planned and existing capabilities to determine the shortfalls, which are then prioritized into a Prioritized List of Capability Shortfalls (PLOCS). Those Allies advocating an MC role in the political guidance also advocate the MC to become more involved in the requirements generation phase, both by giving directive guidance and by approving the product. This involvement is not in the current Force Planning Process. U.S. policy is that the requirements generation must be done by the SCs in order to secure funding from Congress. US NATO needs to be able to show that the requirements come from the SCs and not from a committee. Assuming this is still the U.S. position, we recommend that a role for the MC in noting or acknowledging the PLOCS with comments might meet the concerns of some Allies without corrupting the priorities assigned by the SCs.

¶4. (C/NF) Step Three - Apportionment of Requirements and Setting of Targets: The contentious issue in this step is the supporting staff. We support the recommendation to create a staff team made up of members of the staffs of the SCs, International Military Staff (IMS), and International (civil) Staff (IS), who would continue to report through their own chains of command, but work jointly to support the process, as a useful first step which will lead to further integration in the future.

¶5. (U) Steps Four - Facilitating Implementation and Five - Review Results - are not contentious.

Committee with Oversight for Defence Planning

¶6. (C) The single most contentious issue in the development of the governance aspects and support structures is the composition and terms of reference for the committee which will have oversight of defence planning. Consensus has formed around the idea that the committee should have two seats at the table per Ally to provide both permanent and specialized representation according to the subject under discussion. This obviates the need for sequential and duplicative work on both the political and military sides of NATO HQ. The duties of this committee would include providing advice and recommendations to the NAC on:

--Preparing political guidance,
--Assigning lead responsibility for capability development to the relevant NATO bodies,
--Assigning targets to nations and NATO bodies
--Conducting the biennial reviews of national capability development
--Periodically assessing NATO wide efforts to address the PLOCS
--Addressing general capability-related policy issues
--Facilitating Coordination of the activities of the relevant committees/bodies responsible in the context of the defence planning outline model.

This body will not interpose itself between the NAC and other council committees. However, the chairmen will report to other senior committees including the MC on relevant issues.

¶7. (C) General Considerations: Given the tasks that this committee will be expected to perform, it will meet at least twice a week. During some periods of the process such as drafting political guidance, preparing ministerial reports, and conducting the multilateral reviews it is conceivable that this committee will meet in the morning and afternoon four days a week.

¶8. (C/NF) The international staff has developed different proposals for the committee. We recommend a hybrid version of the Executive Working Group (Reinforced) with co-chairmanship

by the Deputy Secretary General and the Deputy Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (always a U.S. officer, and already co-chairman of the Senior NATO Logisticians, Conference, and the senior Military representative in nuclear deliberations). However, it needs to be sufficiently flexible to allow for routine work to be conducted by acting chairmen. We believe that we should avoid the extended debate that creating a new body would entail (agreeing to a Terms of Reference regularly takes six to nine months), and we should endorse sufficient flexibility to allow for ease of change in light of experience gained.

¶9. (C) Unless otherwise directed, USNATO and USDELNATOMC will pursue outcomes described in paras above as the debate moves forward with a goal of having work completed by the time of the Krakow Informal Defense Ministers meeting 19-20 February 2009.

VOLKER